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The Charter’s Influence Around the
World
MARK TUSHNET *
Over the past several decades, the influence of the United States Constitution and Supreme
Court around the world has waned while that of the Canadian Charter and Supreme Court has
increased. This article examines several reasons for these changes, including: the relative ages
of the constitutions; the US Supreme Court’s recent conservatism; the Canadian Supreme
Court’s role in developing the doctrine of proportionality; the US Supreme Court’s interest in
originalism; differing structures of constitutional review and judicial supremacy; and the two
Courts’ relative openness to transnational influences.
Au cours des dernières décennies, l’influence partout au monde de la Constitution américaine
et de la Cour suprême des États-Unis a décliné, tandis que celle de la Charte canadienne
et de la Cour suprême du Canada a augmenté. Cet article examine les diverses raisons
à l’origine de ces changements, notamment l’âge relatif de ces constitutions, le récent
conservatisme de la Cour suprême des États-Unis, le rôle de la Cour suprême du Canada
dans l’élaboration de la doctrine de la proportionnalité, l’intérêt de la Cour suprême des
États-Unis pour l’originalisme, les structures différentes de la revue de la constitution et
de la suprématie de l’appareil judiciaire, ainsi que l’ouverture relative des deux cours aux
influences transnationales.
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EVALUATING THE WORLDWIDE INFLUENCE of a nation’s constitution or a supreme
court lies somewhere between a parlour game and an analysis of the deployment of
“soft power” in international relations.1 The exercise is like a parlour game in that
we do not have good metrics for evaluating influence. Recent efforts to quantify
the international influence of national constitutions are intriguing2 but rely on
the creation of indices of similarity and the like, the content of which can be readily
challenged by skeptics. And, notably, the quantification involves only constitutions
and the provisions found within them, not the interpretations of those provisions.
Yet, my sense is that conversations about influence deal much more with the spread
of judicial interpretations than with the diffusion of constitutional provisions.3
The evidence invoked in such conversations is impressionistic and anecdotal.

1.

2.

3.

Originating the term, Joseph Nye defined “soft power” as the ability to get people to do
what the body exercising power wants by co-optation rather than coercion. In explaining the
term, Nye referred specifically to offering “values” and other examples, including institutions,
which are attractive enough to emulate. Joseph S Nye Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in
World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).
See David S Law & Mila Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution” (2012) 87:3 NYUL Rev 762 [Law & Versteeg, “Declining Influence”]. For
responses to Law & Versteeg, see Sujit Choudhry, “Method in Comparative Constitutional
Law: A Comment on Law and Versteeg” (2012) 87:6 NYUL Rev 2078; Zachary Elkins, Tom
Ginsburg & James Melton, “Comments on Law and Versteeg’s The Declining Influence of the
United States Constitution” (2012) 87:6 NYUL Rev 2088; and Vicki C Jackson, “Comment
on Law and Versteeg” (2012) 87:6 NYUL Rev 2102 [Jackson, “Comment”]. For a reply to
these responses, see David S Law & Mila Versteeg, “Debating The Declining Influence of the
United States Constitution: A Response to Professors Choudhry, Jackson and Melkinsburg”
(2012) 87:6 NYUL Rev Online 41.
Anne-Marie Slaughter’s influential discussion of transnational networks, for example, deals
with networks of judges, not constitution makers. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 65-103. To the extent that there is
a scholarly literature on the mechanisms by which constitutional provisions are diffused, it
deals with the role of non-national advisers in drafting national constitutions. See e.g. the
papers presented at the William & Mary Law Review Symposium on Constitution Drafting
in Post-Conflict States (16-17 February 2007), published in (2008) 49:4 Wm & Mary L Rev
1043 at 1043-541.
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Even more, the very idea of influence is vague. Sometimes what might look
like influence—a direct citation of a Canadian constitutional provision or a US
Supreme Court decision, for example—might be nothing more than a reference
to a source that provides a useful framework for articulating already existing
intuitions. Or, the phenomenon might be one of convergence proceeding at
slightly different paces in different nations, giving the illusion of influence but
actually reflecting some underlying cause operating everywhere.
Yet, with all the qualifications implied by the preceding paragraphs, it seems
to me that over the past few decades we have seen a shift in the relative influence
of two important constitutions and constitutional courts—those of the United
States and Canada. Some quantitative analysis indicates that over that period the
Canadian Charter4 has been more influential than the US Constitution,5 where
influence is measured by how similar the text of a nation’s constitution is to the
Charter and the US Constitution.6 It is certainly my impression that, while decisions
by the US Supreme Court had substantial influence on the development of
constitutional jurisprudence elsewhere in the last quarter of the twentieth century,
the Canadian Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has been more
influential since then.7
In any event, I am going to proceed in this article on the assumption, which I
believe is borne out by such evidence as there is, that the Charter and the Canadian
Supreme Court have been relatively more influential on other nations than the US
Constitution and the US Supreme Court since roughly the turn of the century. This
article offers some speculations about why that might have happened. In alphabetical order they are: age; conservatism versus liberalism; doctrine; originalism;
scholarship and legal training; structure; and openness to transnational influence.8
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
US Const.
See Law & Versteeg, “Declining Influence,” supra note 2. For a criticism of the methodology
used in this study, see Choudhry, supra note 2.
There is an obvious timing question that complicates this analysis. Until 1950 the US
Supreme Court had essentially no competitors in developing a constitutional jurisprudence,
so it was bound to be more influential elsewhere than any other court. Once the German
Constitutional Court came into its own, sometime in the late 1950s, a real competitor
was available, particularly because many jurists from other nations received post-graduate
education in Germany (as well as in the United States). The Canadian Supreme Court was a
latecomer, attracting attention only with its Charter-based jurisprudence but—to use a racing
metaphor—it came up quickly on the outside.
My analysis builds upon, and to some degree updates, arguments made in The Honourable
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International
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I use this order because I do not think that any one factor is more important than
another; indeed, as I will argue, many of them are tied—sometimes loosely, sometimes more tightly—to others.
At the start, though, I emphasize that I am making several comparisons and
that my principal comparator jurisdiction is the United States. Sometimes I discuss
the relative influence of the US Constitution and other constitutions, including the
Canadian Charter; at other times I discuss the relative influence of US Supreme
Court decisions and those of other constitutional courts, including Canada’s.

I. AGE
Writing in 1816, Thomas Jefferson described a number of revisions he thought
appropriate in the US Constitution. Then, addressing those who “look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence,” he observed of the framing era, “I knew that
age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It
was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty
years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading … .”9
The US Constitution is an old one; the Canadian Charter—and every other
written constitution in the world—is newer. The experience accumulated in the
many years since the US Constitution’s adoption almost inevitably means that it
will have lost influence relative to newer constitutions.
First, between then and now there have been innovations in the mechanics
of governance. Examples include the invention of the specialized constitutional
court and of the single transferable vote; the creation of a fourth branch composed
of administrative bureaucracies; and the formation of a fifth branch consisting of
various transparency institutions such as anticorruption agencies and boundary
commissions for districting. The US Constitution can be amended or creatively
interpreted to accommodate the innovations that seem appropriate to US citizens
today. But, after the innovations have come about, those designing constitutions
can simply build the desirable innovations into the constitutions they are proposing.
Innovation alone would account for some reduction in the influence of the US Constitution relative to newer ones, though it would not account for which more recent
constitutions have become more influential.

9.

Impact of the Rehnquist Court” (1998) 34:1 Tulsa LJ 15. See also Adam M Dodek, “Canada
as Constitutional Exporter: The Rise of the ‘Canadian Model’ of Constitutionalism” (2007)
36 Sup Ct L Rev 2d 309.
Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (12 June 1816), online: <http://
teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=459>.
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The Charter implements one innovation in the technology of governance
through the Canadian version of what I have called “weak-form review.”10 I discuss
this in more detail below in Part VI, and for now I note only that weak-form
review was truly an innovation in 1982. Like all good inventions, weak-form
review has been tweaked and perhaps improved elsewhere. These developments
are follow-ons to the Canadian innovation and so they are properly considered
examples of Canadian influence on other constitutions.
Second, and more relevant to this article’s theme, time has revealed that
governments can overreach in more ways than the authors of the US Constitution
anticipated, often as a result of technological developments, and also that the
deployment of government power may sometimes be more desirable than those
authors believed. The rights inscribed in the US Constitution and the powers
available to the national government in the United States might be thought
too limited today. Again, in the United States these matters have been dealt
with by occasional constitutional amendments and, more frequently, creative
interpretations. Yet, once again, the experience of more than two hundred years
allows today’s constitution drafters to address these new problems of rights and
powers more directly.
Here the Charter offers some examples. First, section 2(b) guarantees “freedom
… of other media of communication,”11 which provides a firmer textual base for
protecting expression on the Internet and in social media than does the US First
Amendment.12 Second, the Charter takes a more detailed approach to equality
rights than does the US Constitution. In the United States, equality under state
laws is guaranteed by a general equality clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.13
This clause creates textual awkwardness in connection with guarantees of equality
under national law, there being no similar general equality clause applicable to
the national government. And, perhaps more important, experience has shown
that particular classes can be special targets of discrimination, and that it takes
more effort to deal with those classes through the interpretation of a general
10. “Weak-form review” refers to a practice in which a high court’s decision finding a statute
unconstitutional can be revised by a legislature through some mechanism other than
constitutional amendment. For a recent discussion, see Mark Tushnet, “The rise of weakform judicial review” in Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon, eds, Comparative Constitutional
Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) 321.
11. Charter, supra note 4, s 2(b).
12. US Const amend I (stating that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press…”).
13. US Const amend XIV (stating that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws”).
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equality clause than when those classes (or at least some of them) are specifically listed
in the constitution, as in section 15 of the Charter. Augmenting a general equality
clause with a list of protected classes and a catch-all statement allowing extensions
by analogy, as section 15’s “in particular” does (albeit somewhat indirectly), provides
more guidance than a general equality clause alone.14
Third, equality clauses, whether general or with lists of protected classes,
typically create problems in connection with affirmative action programs because
the classes are described in general terms such as “race” or “gender.” The solution,
widely adopted, lies in stating in the constitution that equality guarantees do
not “preclude any law … that has as its object the amelioration of conditions
of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged”
by their membership in the specially protected classes, as section 15(2) puts it.15
This is not to say that the same result could not be reached under a general equality
clause, but only that experience showed the value of specifically identifying
affirmative action as permissible no matter what the general or enumerated
equality clauses said.
A more limited but probably important effect of the relative ages of the US and
Canadian constitutions is that the latter is temporally closer to modern international
human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.16 Judges
seeking to participate in the worldwide network of constitutional court judges find it
natural to use the terms of those documents in their interactions, and those terms
more readily fit within the contours of the Charter than within those of the US
Bill of Rights.17 So, when looking for sources that seem similar to those animating
the international human rights documents, those judges will discover more value
in Canadian than in US doctrine.
Drafters of modern constitutions can take account of experience in a
way that the drafters of the US Constitution could not. The age of the US
Constitution therefore limits its influence—though again I emphasize that this
point does not single out the Canadian Charter as particularly influential among
modern constitutions.

14. However, identifying the specially protected classes in the constitution does not solve the
problems that experience can reveal, as has become clear in connection with discrimination
against gay, lesbian, and transgendered people.
15. Charter, supra note 4, s 15(2).
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No 13,
UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) 71 [Universal Declaration].
17. US Const amends I-X.
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II. CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM
Drafted in the 1780s and with no large-scale amendments after the 1860s, the
US Constitution reflects the presuppositions of classical liberalism. Though it
does not rule out choices reflecting modern ideas of social democracy, neither does
it enshrine them as matters of deep constitutional value.18 Constitutions adopted
in the twentieth century, in contrast, have been deeply influenced by ideas of
social solidarity, Christian democracy, and social democracy. Parties seeking
large-scale transformations in property distribution typically led the national
independence movements that resulted in colonial independence. A classically
liberal constitution did not provide an acceptable model, at least not immediately.
Constitution makers in the nations of the former Soviet empire clearly rejected
socialism as a constitutional model, but even those most committed to classical
liberalism understood that their nations’ peoples had come to accept some degree
of social democracy as a foundation for their specific form of constitutionalism.
The US Constitution could not be a model for them, either. Yet, it is worth noting
that neither could the Charter. Though adopted in 1982 and in a nation where
social solidarity is far more deeply embedded than in the United States, the Charter
reflects no social democratic commitments, as Gosselin confirms.19
The situation with the US and Canadian Supreme Courts is different. The
great waves of constitutionalization that occurred in the 1970s, mostly in Latin
America, and the 1980s and 1990s, mostly in central and eastern Europe, were
waves of liberalization after the demise of authoritarianism. When those waves
occurred, the Warren Court dominated the world’s image of the US Supreme
Court,20 which then became characterized as a liberal court, where “liberal” is a
term describing not a deep political theory but the ordinary politics of the day.21
18. The US Constitution was not formally amended to accommodate the expansion of national
power, and the increasing role of social democracy, after the New Deal. That in turn eased
the path to constitutional challenges to The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
which would have been more difficult had there been a formal constitutional amendment
embodying the New Deal “settlement.” See The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
19. Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, 4 SCR 429. In this context I mean
only that Gosselin provides no model for nations with social democratic constitutional
commitments to emulate and do not mean to take a position on the decision’s correctness as
a matter of Canadian constitutional law.
20. As discussed in Mary L Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
21. See e.g. Lucas A Powe, Jr, The Warren Court and American Politics (Cambridge: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2000).
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Constitutional courts in these nations could, if they chose, use the Warren Court’s
decisions as a model for their own. This was particularly true with respect to
some issues central to the transition from authoritarianism to liberal constitutionalism: for example, the regulation of speech critical of the government in
power and the regulation of the criminal process to avoid politically motivated
abuses. The Warren Court had a well-developed jurisprudence that courts elsewhere
could follow or even adopt wholesale. During these periods the influence of the
US Supreme Court outside the United States was at its peak.
Yet even when the Warren Court dominated understanding of the US
Supreme Court, the Court’s liberal image had become inaccurate, and the
inaccuracies became more apparent from the 1990s through the present. The
Warren Court ended formally in 1969, with Earl Warren’s replacement by Warren
Burger, though the Warren Court’s liberal jurisprudence staggered on for about
two decades more. But by no later than the turn of the century the illusion that
the US Supreme Court was a liberal court could not be sustained. And yet, with
the transition from authoritarianism still incomplete in many places, judges on
constitutional courts who hoped to advance the liberalization project still needed
models. With the US Supreme Court no longer helpful, they turned elsewhere—
namely, to the German Constitutional Court and the Canadian Supreme Court.
At least tangentially related to the issue of conservatism versus liberalism
is a complex of political economy issues.22 One aspect of the contemporary US
Supreme Court’s decisions is a tendency to restrict the scope of constitutional
adjudication, for example, by imposing stringent standing requirements or
by adopting doctrines that expressly incorporate a standard of deference to
legislatures. Although that tendency is in fact highly qualified, with the Court
endorsing what remains a rather generous approach to standing and being
deferential only on occasion,23 I believe that the relevant non-US audiences
would describe the Court’s current jurisprudence as restrictive. Now consider a
nation with a new constitution after an authoritarian era. The constitution will of
course include a constitutional court. Yet, if that court entertains constitutional
challenges only rarely or is quite deferential to the political branches, citizens
22. I owe this paragraph to comments from Vicki Jackson.
23. On standing, see e.g. Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency, 549 US 497, 127
S Ct 1438 (2007) (holding that a state, as an owner of shorefront property, had standing
to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s refusal to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions, because the failure to regulate might lead to global warming that would raise sea
levels and so deprive the state of some of its property). The Court’s free speech jurisprudence
is notably non-deferential. For an exception, see Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S
Ct 2705, 177 L Ed 2d 355 (2010).
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might wonder what value they were getting from the court.24 And, from the
court’s point of view, ruling in favour of constitutional claims presented to it can
demonstrate its value and thereby create some legitimacy for a novel institution.
Here, too, a note of caution is appropriate. The method by which the judges on
the German Constitutional Court are selected guarantees a balanced jurisprudence
that will always contain important liberal elements in both the political theory
and quotidian senses. The deep commitments of the German Basic Law as a
response to the National Socialist era further guarantees the presence of these
liberal elements. Lacking that historical experience, the Charter’s commitments
to quotidian liberalism are, I think, weaker. And, perhaps more important, the
methods of judicial selection in Canada can produce a succession of courts, with
liberal ones being replaced, as in the United States, by more conservative ones.
For the moment, the Canadian Supreme Court may be more influential around
the world than the US Supreme Court, but that could change.
On a more mundane level, some of the US Supreme Court’s decisions are
puzzling (or worse) to those from different constitutional traditions. That people
in the United States have a constitutional right, of whatever uncertain scope, to
possess handguns for self-protection is, I think, quite surprising to people elsewhere.
In the area of free expression, decisions sharply restricting the regulation of hate
speech and campaign financing—characterized as conservative decisions—conflict
with the constitutional jurisprudence of most other nations.25 Their conservatism
tarnishes the image of the US Constitution, or at least the image of the US Supreme
Court.26 And, the defense of the US decisions as part of a coherent overall
24. See Stephen Holmes & Cass R Sunstein, “The Politics of Constitutional Amendment in
Eastern Europe” in Sanford Levinson, ed, Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice
of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) 275 at 284-85
(stating that “the very creation of a constitutional culture in post-Communist societies
depends upon a willingness to mix constitutional politics and ordinary politics”). Stephen
Holmes and Cass Sunstein argue, with many qualifications, that these nations might be
getting an experience of self-governance that the authoritarian regime had denied them. I
note that recent revisions to the Hungarian Constitution sharply limiting the Constitutional
Court’s role and altering its composition are widely viewed as opening up the possibility of a
return to authoritarian rule.
25. For overviews of these topics, see Michel Rosenfeld, “Regulation of Hate Speech” in Vikram
David Amar & Mark V Tushnet, eds, Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009) 181; Richard L Hasen, “Regulation of Campaign Finance” in
ibid, 198.
26. As Benjamin Berger suggested in his comments on an earlier version of this article, the
death penalty cases may not only make reference to the US Supreme Court unattractive but
sometimes perhaps affirmatively harmful if the taint associated with that Court would spread
to the citing court.
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structure of constitutional doctrine actually makes things worse. It might remove
the “taint” associated with the label “conservative,” but it does so at the cost of
making the US Constitution less attractive as a whole.

III. DOCTRINE
The core of the story about constitutional doctrine is simple, though its details
are rather complex. Proportionality may not be the ultimate rule of law, as David
Beatty would have it,27 but it is an approach to constitutional interpretation that
many judges around the world find attractive. Proportionality as a doctrine is
not unknown in US constitutional history, where it—or something that could
have been recast as proportionality—was known under the label “balancing.”28
As constitutions and constitutional courts were created in the late twentieth
century, the US Supreme Court abandoned balancing as a doctrine in favour of
a more rules-oriented approach largely because of the sequence of cases it faced,
dealing first with classic sedition cases and then cases arising out of the US
movement for civil rights for African Americans. In legal theory, Robert Alexy
set out a structured framework for conducting a proportionality analysis; in
constitutional doctrine, the Canadian Supreme Court did the same in Oakes.29
So, Canada offered the world’s constitutional courts a doctrinal formulation
compatible with judges’ deepest instincts, and the US Supreme Court did not.
Under the circumstances, the decline in the influence of the US Supreme Court
relative to the Canadian Supreme Court is entirely understandable.
Now for some of the details. The US Supreme Court turned against balancing
in large part because the Court became more conservative. Scholars have shown
in enormous detail that there is no necessary connection between legal ideology and
interpretive approaches: There can be conservative balancing and liberal rules, for
example.30 But, in the late twentieth century, the association between the Court’s
conservative turn and its abandonment of balancing was forged by conservatives
27. David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
28. On the differences between proportionality and balancing, see Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo
Porat, “American balancing and German proportionality: The historical origins” (2010) 8:2
Int’l J Const L 263; Jacco Bomhoff, “Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing
as a Problematic Turn in Comparative (Constitutional) Law” (2008) 31:2 Hastings Int’l &
Comp L Rev 555.
29. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, translated by Julian Rivers (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002); R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200.
30. See e.g. Kathleen M Sullivan, “The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards” (1992) 106:1 Harv L Rev 22.
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in their critique of the Warren Court. To condense what is again a complicated
story: Conservatives criticized the Warren Court for doing no more than enacting
the liberal justices’ policy preferences into constitutional law, pretending that
the law contained those preferences all along. They were, as conservatives put it,
simply making things up. The way to avoid making things up was to adopt originalism as an interpretive theory. But with originalism in hand, conservatives
came to think that, except in the rare situations where the original understandings
licensed the judges to balance interests, balancing amounted to making things
up, too.31
While proportionality analysis remains an important part of US constitutional
doctrine, it plays a role that can be teased out only by careful examination of specific
constitutional doctrines, rather than a role that appears on the doctrinal surface. As
Alexy and others have discussed, judges and analysts can treat proportionality as
an approach that operates within specific doctrines or as something that determines
the boundaries within and outside of which different rules prevail.32 In the United
States proportionality operates as a boundary-determining doctrine. In the area
of free speech, it operates under the name of “categorical balancing.”33 When used
to determine doctrinal boundaries, though, the approach, at least as developed by
the US Supreme Court, does not bring all the relevant considerations to the surface.
In contrast, Oakes offers a much more perspicuous account of proportionality, with
a structured approach readily adoptable by other courts.34
This analysis offers a perspective on Frederick Schauer’s argument that
constitutional courts outside the United States are attracted to proportionality
and the open discussion of the steps involved because they are developing doctrine
from a low baseline.35 Schauer argues that judges feeling their way into a new
31. For a general account of the rise of originalism in response to Warren Court decisions, with
some passing comments on balancing, see Johnathan O’Neill, Originalism in American
Law and Politics: A Constitutional History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
2005), ch 3.
32. Alexy, supra note 29. Notably, Alexy argues that viewing proportionality as internal makes
the most sense of German constitutional doctrine, but not that such an understanding is
required by the very idea of proportionality.
33. Its originalist commitments led the US Supreme Court to reject, though with inadequate
reasons, the use of categorical balancing to identify subjects of regulation not otherwise
identified in the relevant historical materials. See United States v Stevens, 130 S Ct 1577, 176
L Ed 2d 435 (2010).
34. And, in my view, the approach in Oakes is easier to understand than Alexy’s—especially with
respect to Alexy’s effort to mathematize his approach.
35. Frederick Schauer, “The Convergence of Rules and Standards” [2003] NZL Rev 303 at 32627; Frederick Schauer, “Freedom of expression adjudication in Europe and the United States:

538

(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

doctrinal field will be attracted to proportionality tests to ensure that they do
not ignore features of the problem that a well-designed legal system would take
into account. As they gain experience, though, judges learn that some things that
were seemingly relevant in the past almost never play a dispositive role and can
be ignored thereafter. Rules then emerge when courts formulate doctrines that,
as rules necessarily do, screen from judicial consideration features of the problem
that are too often mistakenly thought relevant. Note, though, that this is, or at
least is very close to, a description of the way in which proportionality operates as
a boundary-defining approach. If Schauer is right, we can imagine that the relative
influence of the US and Canadian Supreme Courts on other courts might reverse
itself as those courts gain experience and the need for the structure made available
by Oakes weakens.

IV. ORIGINALISM
Thomas Jefferson referred to the “reverence” that US citizens gave to the Constitution’s
authors just before 1820.36 If anything, that reverence has increased with time. It has
made originalism a distinctively US form of constitutional interpretation, followed
almost nowhere else,37 or at least without anything like the rigour with which it is
used in the United States. I hasten to add that originalism is only one mode of
constitutional interpretation in the United States and perhaps not even the dominant
one. Yet, it is probably the interpretive approach that has attracted the most
attention in the United States and elsewhere. In another example of how the
reasons for changes in relative influence are interconnected, the rise of originalism
is associated with the increasing conservatism of the US Supreme Court. As
discussed above in Part III, originalism developed as the conservative interpretive
theory challenging the Warren Court’s liberalism.
Originalism lacks a hold in other constitutional systems for several reasons.
First, with a few notable exceptions such as Germany and India, modern
constitutions are new. Their authors are still alive or have only recently died. I
suspect that in the first generation or two after a constitution is adopted, people
do not think that they are engaged in a process of interpreting the constitution.
a case study in comparative constitutional architecture” in Georg Nolte, ed, European and US
Constitutionalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 49 at 49-56.
36. Jefferson, supra note 9.
37. Australia comes closest, I think, and even there the justification for the prevailing interpretive
approach is called “formalist” rather than originalist. For a discussion of Australian
formalism (or legalism), see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “Australia: Devotion to Legalism” in Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, ed, Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (2006) 106.
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Rather, they understand themselves to be simply reading it. And reading does not
have to be deeply theorized.
Second, knowledgeable interpreters of relatively new constitutions know that
these documents are messy combinations of deep principle and the political deals
needed to secure the constitution’s proposal and adoption. They know who the
deal makers were, they know their quirks, and they know that it is a mistake to
interpret the constitution as a wholly integrated and principled document whose
parts fit smoothly together. Some of those responsible for bringing a constitutional
project to fruition, like B.R. Ambedkar, are indeed revered today; others, such as
Eamon de Valera, less so.38 With the passage of time, perhaps these deals will fade
into the background and originalism will seem more attractive. But, for now and
to many, originalism seems at odds with the political reality from which recently
created constitutions emerged.39
Perhaps as a result of these contingent facts, the US theory of originalism lacks
a good foothold elsewhere. This lack is exacerbated by some of the arguments
made in support of originalism. So, for example, the argument that originalism
is validated by a written text cannot be taken seriously by people who already
find originalism odd, because reliance on the text itself is a form of originalism.
Moreover, originalism as an express theory of interpretation is relatively new
in the United States, emerging in the late 1970s as a basis for conservative
criticism of the Warren Court and its liberal rulings.40 For those not embedded
in US controversies, originalism could be seen as something added on to existing interpretive methods, not as something that cast doubt on their validity.
Therefore, outside the United States, other interpretive methods could survive
without much difficulty.
38. BR Ambedkar was the principal drafter of the Indian Constitution; Eamon de Valera
was the political leader of Irish independence who shepherded the Irish Constitution of
1937 to adoption.
39. Consider here the contested origins of the notwithstanding clause and its emergence as a
way of getting First Ministers from several provinces to accept the Charter as a whole despite
their misgivings about its departure from parliamentary supremacy—close to a raw political
deal—and the way the clause functions in the principled defense of weak-form constitutional
review. For a brief description of the political background underlying the notwithstanding
clause, see Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare
Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) at
52-53 [Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights]. Outsiders like me, and Canadians (as memory
of the negotiations over framing the Charter fade), can offer a principled defence of the
notwithstanding clause, a defence that will undoubtedly seem rather too fancy for those who
still remember how it came into being.
40. See O’Neill, supra note 31.
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Notably, Canada supplies the most powerful metaphorical counter to
originalism: the “living tree” metaphor from the Persons Case.41 In the United
States, the idea of a living constitution is juxtaposed to originalism. Essentially
everywhere else, the “living tree” metaphor describes the alternative and preferred
approach to constitutional interpretation.42 The Canadian Supreme Court’s
commitment to the “living tree” metaphor casts a benevolent light over its
decisions, or at least casts a better light on its decisions than the US Supreme
Court’s commitment (such as it is) to originalism casts on its own decisions.

V. SCHOLARSHIP AND LEGAL TRAINING
In the 1960s and 1970s, US constitutional scholarship defined the terms of the
debate about the legitimacy and scope of review. Alexander Bickel’s identification
of the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty seemed particularly important in
nations with newly established or newly empowered constitutional courts, most
dramatically in nations with long traditions of parliamentary supremacy.43 John
Hart Ely’s work on representation-reinforcing review offered a response to Bickel
that scholars of constitutional law outside the United States found attractive.44
These intellectual influences were reinforced by patterns of postgraduate legal
education. Many scholars from around the world found opportunities for graduate
study in the United States, where they absorbed the terminology and the substance
of discussions within US constitutional law and theory.
As newer constitutional courts gained experience and power, the concerns
emerging from US theory weakened. The countermajoritarian anxiety, which
continues to define important contours of US constitutional theory, faded as
scholars and courts turned their attention to actually implementing the constitutions
they had. The countermajoritarian difficulty morphed into concern over defining

41. Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] AC 124 at 136, [1929] All ER Rep 571 PC (Eng).
42. I hazard a guess that the main competitor to the “living tree” metaphor is the German idea
that a constitution embodies an “objective order of values.” See Lüth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198,
1958 NJW 257 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany), translated in Donald P Kommers & Russell A
Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 3d ed, (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2012) at 442-48.
43. Alexander M Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
44. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980) (rejecting constitutional interpretations that rely solely on either the
text or underlying moral values; instead arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted
in a way that reinforces representative democracy).
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how proportionality review could be conducted and defended. Furthermore,
patterns of postgraduate legal training changed—or, at least, existing patterns
of postgraduate training in private law were modified to include postgraduate
training in public law. To oversimplify: Scholars-in-training from Australia and
other Commonwealth nations had always received postgraduate instruction in
Great Britain; those from East Asia had received instruction in Germany. Now,
their successors received instruction in the same locations, but in public as well as
private law. The specific concerns of US constitutional law and theory no longer
play as central a role in postgraduate training as they used to. And, unsurprisingly,
the influence of US concerns has diminished.
Canada plays only a small part in that story, but a larger one in a related
account. Relying heavily on the arguments for federalism and separation of
powers in The Federalist Papers,45 US constitutional scholarship treats those
institutional arrangements as locations for conflict and struggle, with the end
of protecting liberty by limiting government power. In contrast, Canada’s legal
culture, reflecting its culture more generally, treats those institutional arrangements
as locations for cooperation and for the production of freedom-enhancing
government policies. The Canadian way of thinking resonates more substantially
with nations whose constitutions and politics embody principles of subsidiarity
and social solidarity—roughly speaking, social democratic nations, which make up
a large set of nations embracing the post-World War II model of constitutionalism.
Canadian ways of thinking may be more congenial than US ones in such nations.

VI. STRUCTURE AND STRONG JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Consider the situation of many constitution drafters in the second half of the
twentieth century. Some—perhaps most—were in nations with a tradition of
either parliamentary supremacy or presidential domination, and of these many
were dealing with transitions from authoritarianism to liberal democracy.
Some form of constitutional review by independent courts was enormously
attractive as a defense against a reversion to authoritarianism. But, what form
of constitutional review?
The United States offered one model: a system of strong judicial supremacy
(strong-form review) backed up by an amendment rule that makes overturning
judicial decisions by constitutional amendment difficult. That system raised a
number of problems. First, and probably least important, staffing the courts with
45. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, The Federalist, ed by Jacob E Cooke
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961).
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judges committed to liberal democracy was going to be quite difficult. Most of the
judges in place had been reliable servants of the prior regime, and the new regime’s
leaders were inevitably suspicious of them.46 Second, strong judicial supremacy
threatened to replace one group of unaccountable rulers, the authoritarians, with
another, the judges. The spectre of gouvernement des juges47 continued to haunt.
Finally, as Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein argued, albeit somewhat too strongly,
the newly empowered citizens in these nations had been politically infantilized and
needed to act politically in ways that embodied their new responsibilities as citizens.48
Strong judicial supremacy might impede the required maturation by communicating to citizens that they could continue to be irresponsible because someone
else would bail them out of whatever difficulties they created.
The Charter offered an interesting alternative to strong judicial supremacy
(through what I have called weak-form review),49 by way of section 1’s general
limitations clause and section 33’s notwithstanding clause. The Charter’s precise
contours, and even the justifications offered by Canadian scholars for the Charter’s
version of constitutional review,50 mattered less than the simple fact that it opened
the way to creative thinking about the structure of constitutional review. To many
constitution drafters, this weak-form constitutional review was a more attractive
reconciliation of the requirements implicit in liberal democracy—roughly, rightsprotection and self-government—than US-style strong-form review. And, finally,
Canada provided the first real model for weak-form review.51 Notably, as a model,
the Canadian provisions might be followed or developed despite the practically
non-existent use of section 33 to override parliamentary legislation.
46. This was true, I think, even where the judges asserted, with some plausibility, that they
were strong positivists committed to fair enforcement of the law given to them, whatever
its content. They had been reliable servants of the authoritarian regime because they were
positivists, and would be equally reliable servants of liberal democracy for the same reason.
47. Edouard Lambert, Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation social aux ÉtatsUnis: l’expérience américaine du contrôle judiciare de la constitutionnalité des lois (Paris: Marcel
Giard & Cie, 1921).
48. Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 24 at 306.
49. Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights, supra note 39.
50. I have in mind here the different characterizations offered by those scholars of “dialogue” as
a distinctive and important feature of the Charter regime. For a collection of essays on the
concept of dialogue, see the special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal entitled “Charter
Dialogue: Ten Years Later,” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ.
51. It may be worth noting that even in the United States defenders of constitutional review have
become increasingly agnostic about whether the reasons for constitutional review support
only strong-form review or, instead, can be satisfied by weak-form review. See, e.g. Richard H
Fallon, Jr, “The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review” (2008) 121:7 Harv L Rev 1693.
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Note as well that, to the extent that the general limitations clause plays a part
in the defense of weak-form review, the reason for the greater relative influence of
Canada compared to the United States converges with the doctrinal developments
sketched in the preceding Part. Here, then, we can see how the Charter and
the Canadian Supreme Court have contributed to the shift in “soft power”
towards Canada.

VII. TRANSNATIONAL INFLUENCE
I begin this Part with the mundane observation that the US Supreme Court
issues its decisions in one of the world’s dominant legal languages, and the
Canadian Supreme Court does so in two. Even as English becomes the world’s
lingua franca, the Canadian Supreme Court’s decisions are overall more accessible
to interested audiences than are the US Court’s decisions. Though done for
wholly domestic reasons, the Canadian Supreme Court’s practice enhances
its reputation abroad.52
As Vicki Jackson has shown, the US Supreme Court has a long tradition of
referring to non-US law in interpreting the US Constitution. These references
are predominantly, but not exclusively, to the law of countries in the common
law tradition.53 Sometimes these references could be understood as attempts to
determine the meaning of terms in the US Constitution that are derived from the
common law, even when the references were to post-1789 common law. More
often, the references were embedded in an eclectic approach to constitutional
interpretation. For example, the Court might refer to experience with particular
forms of criminal procedure in other nations to show that interpreting the US
Constitution to require those forms would have good or bad consequences.54
More recently, although the practice of referring to non-US law continues, it has
become controversial. The reason, in part, is the rise of originalism in constitutional
interpretation. Referring to sources from the present day, whether those sources
are from outside or within the United States, is thought to be inconsistent with
originalism’s exclusive focus on events and understandings at the time that the
relevant constitutional provisions were adopted.

52. An antic thought: Perhaps the Canadian Supreme Court should consider offering official
translations of selected decisions into German (the world’s third legal language).
53. Vicki C Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010) at ch 4 [Jackson, Constitutional Engagement].
54. Or to refute claims that such an interpretation would have bad consequences. See e.g.
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602 at 1652-53 (1966).
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More important, though, has been the association of this practice with
litigation challenging the death penalty (and, more recently, litigation challenging
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and challenging the conditions
of confinement at “supermax”—super-maximum security—prisons). On many
issues, US constitutional law is reasonably “good” from the perspective of the
transnational NGOs that have become involved in this litigation, so referring
to non-US law adds nothing to the arguments available from the US legal
materials alone. And, on many other issues, the United States occupies a position
on a spectrum of possibilities, many of which have been realized elsewhere. So,
to overstate, with respect to these issues, every citation to a non-US source favouring
one position could be countered by a citation to another non-US source favouring
the position already in place in the United States. Consider, for example, the question
of gay marriage. Those who believe that gay marriage is inherent in principles of
equality can certainly point to statutes and constitutional holdings in other nations,
including Canada. But, of course, those who believe that gay marriage is at most
a matter of legislative policy choice can point to statutes and constitutional holdings
in a different group of nations. Again, the reference to non-US materials would
be largely pointless.55
Death penalty and, more generally, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is
different. First, as a matter of stated doctrine, the US Supreme Court has held
that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted with reference to the “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”56 That doctrine
invites (though it does not compel) reference to the standards as they have evolved
in other maturing societies. In addition, capital punishment and related issues are
ones about which there really is a transnational consensus against the US position.
In consequence, referring to non-US law points in a single direction.57
The association between references to non-US law and the campaign against
the death penalty and related issues created the controversy over such references.58
55. I can imagine an argument identifying an international trend toward a consensus position,
even though that position is not yet the consensus. I think that casting this argument in
terms that fit well with US constitutional doctrine would likely be quite difficult.
56. Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86 at 101, 78 S Ct 590 (1958).
57. Or, at worst, it puts the advocates of the contrary position at a rhetorical disadvantage: “Do
you want the United States to be like Somalia?”
58. I should note, as Professor Jackson has pointed out, that justices opposed to the US Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence dealing with the right to choose with respect to abortion sometimes
argue that US jurisprudence on this issue is as much an international outlier as the US
position on the death penalty. She argues, though, that the gap between stated jurisprudence
and actual practice is substantial (on both sides), making the US practice and the non-US
jurisprudence and practice roughly compatible with each other. (I should note that this is my
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Once it existed, though, critics of the practice in death penalty cases created
a general theoretical case against such references, not confined to observations
about originalism. As a result, there is now a general controversy over references
to non-US law in US constitutional interpretation.
The implications of that controversy for the influence of US Supreme Court
decisions elsewhere are reasonably clear. Informally, the thought by judges outside
the United States is, “If you are not going to listen to us, why should we listen
to you?” Somewhat more formally, exercising soft power—influence—requires a
certain kind of gentle reciprocity short of equal exchange. The controversy over
references to non-US law shows that there is a real possibility that being influenced
by US constitutional law will not be reciprocated.
The Canadian Supreme Court is entirely comfortable with referring to nonCanadian law in interpreting the Charter. Of course, so are many other nations
with respect to their own constitutions. This factor too helps explain the declining
influence of the US Supreme Court’s decisions without explaining why the Canadian
Supreme Court has become distinctively more influential. Here I can only hazard
the guess that openness to non-Canadian sources is one of several factors, including
liberalism and the accessibility of its opinions that, taken together, give the
Canadian Supreme Court a “boost” elsewhere.

VIII. CONCLUSION
As I suggested at the outset, the reasons one might have for attempting to determine
the influence of a specific constitution or constitutional court’s decisions are
somewhat obscure. National pride plays a part, of course, which can be characterized
alternatively as preening (pejoratively) or kvelling (approvingly).59
A scholar’s perspective complicates the view. Probably most important, sorting
out the influences of a host of factors is likely to be quite difficult. Take
proportionality: I have discussed Alexy and Oakes, but the phrasing that licenses
proportionality review in Canada, “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society,”60 finds a parallel
in section 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “such limitations
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
characterization of her position, not hers.) See Jackson, Constitutional Engagement, supra
note 53.
59. “To kvell” (from the Yiddish) means “to express pride in the accomplishments of someone to
whom one is related, usually a son or daughter.”
60. Charter, supra note 4, s 1.
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respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”61 When
other constitutions adopt (in their own languages) phrases that are used in the
Charter, are we observing the influence of the Charter, the influence of the
Universal Declaration, or the influence of more general ideas about the proper
relation between government power and protection of rights?62 When other
nations’ constitutional courts cite Oakes as they perform proportionality review,
might not the citation be “decoration” rather than an example of influence?
Similar arguments could be made about section 33 and the override power.
It has conceptual antecedents in emergency powers provisions common in
constitutions since the early twentieth century (if not Roman times): Emergency
powers could override constitutional protections when imperatively required by
national conditions. Should emergency powers be taken as the true origin of weakform judicial review rather than section 33 and the general limitations clause?
Finally, a thought about example-setting as a way of exercising soft power:
With the caveat that I am not familiar with the literature on soft power and may
be making a point addressed in that literature, I wonder whether a nation can
exercise soft power once the means of doing so is identified and labelled in those
very terms. That is, I wonder about the effects of an open acknowledgement along
the following lines: “The United States (or Canada) knows that it lacks the coercive
force to compel you to follow its lead, but is trying to induce you to do so by
offering the examples of the Constitution (or Charter) and the Supreme Court to
demonstrate that the US (or Canadian) system overall is so attractive that you ought
to follow the United States (or Canada) as a leader in some relevant domain.” My
sense, but it is only that, is that acknowledging that some practice is an exercise
of soft power deprives the practice of its effectiveness as such an exercise.
In the end, then, discussing the relative influence of the US Constitution and
the Canadian Charter may only be a parlour game. But, I confess, I find it engaging
at least for some few moments.

61. Universal Declaration, supra note 16, art 29(2) (at 76-77).
62. Commenting on Law & Versteeg, “Declining Influence,” supra note 2, Vicki Jackson suggests
that some of the most important ways in which the US Constitution has been influential is
in putting on the table the very idea that constitutions ought to be written and in offering
an example of institutionalizing the separation of powers. Yet, one might respond that the
ultimate sources of influence here would be Aristotle, John Locke, and Montesquieu, and
determining whether their ideas were influential through the mediating effects of the US
Constitution would be quite difficult. See Jackson, “Comment,” supra note 2.

